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1. Introduction 
1.1. The economics of commercial shipbuilding are under-researched (Heaver, 
2012, p. 28; Woo et al., 2013) and the subject is not widely understood in 
terms of economic fundamentals1.  The commercial shipbuilding market is 
clearly established as one of the four ‘shipping markets’ (Stopford, 2009, p. 
175), and its under-representation in research cannot be explained by any 
lack of issues that need to be resolved: commercial shipbuilding remains an 
economically difficult sector2. 
1.2. The fundamental lack of understanding was found to be a problem in 2003, 
when the European Union tried to prosecute a complaint through the World 
Trade Organization, seeking redress for alleged anti-competitive practices 
and subsidies.  The WTO panel concluded that the EU had failed to establish 
sufficiently the nature of the international commercial shipbuilding market and 
its pricing mechanisms.  Fundamentally, the panel concluded that the EU had 
failed to establish definitively that a commercial shipbuilding market exists at 
all.  Particular difficulties were related to the issue of Cross-Price Elasticity 
and the identification of ‘Like Products’. 
1.3. Like products (also referred to as similar products or substitutable products) 
are at the core of competition law and determine whether or not producs that 
are physically different can be regarded as being part of the same market.  Is 
an LNG tanker, for example, part of the same market as a container ship?  
They cannot be substituted functionally by the user (an LNG tanker cannot be 
used to carry containers and vice versa) and the relationship between them 
from an economic perspective can be difficult to see.  When viewed from the 
perspective of the producer (i.e. the shipyard), however, likeness is 
dependent on whether the two products can form part of the shipyard’s 
product mix, that is to say can be competitively constructed by the shipyard.  If 
different ship types can be substituted to competitively utilise the shipyard’s 
facilities, they can correctly be identified as ‘like products’.  For like products, 
demand for one will contribute to the determination of price of another, 
referred to as ‘cross-price elasticity’.  Thus, injurious pricing for one ship type 
can be seen as damaging to a different ship type that is a like product.  Such 
a relationship could not be established to the satisfaction of the WTO panel in 
the EU’s 2003 action. 
                                            
1 This comment is based on analysis of contributions to the two main journals relating to maritime 
economics, presented in the two papers cited. 
2 The shipbuilding market differs to the other three sectors (the freight market, the sale and purchase 
market and the demolition market) in that it relates to manufacturing industry, rather than trade and 
transport.  This may partially explain why it receives less attention in maritime economics, which is 
dominated by trade and transport economics.  Other difficulties relate to problems of measurement of 
shipyard capacity and difficulty in understanding the heterogeneity of apparently differing products.  
These difficulties are addressed later in this paper. 
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1.4. Research undertaken at Newcastle University3 between 2012 and 2017 
aimed to clarify the difficulties faced in seeking to regulate competition using 
WTO instruments and to improve knowledge of the working of the market.  
This report summarises some of the key conclusions of that work, which it is 
hoped will contribute to the work of OECD WP6.  It also includes 
recommendations for further research, aimed ultimately at improving the 
economic sustainability of the sector. 
1.5. The following subjects are summarised: 
 the nature of the market, which is essentially based on trade in 
shipyard capacity, rather than the trade in ships (which are constructed 
after a significant lag from the time of contract signature and allocation 
of forward capacity (a ‘slot’), when price is normally fixed); 
 the determination of price and, in particular, the cross relationship 
between prices of products (ships) that appear to be physically very 
different and therefore unrelated (for example, a container ship 
compared to an LNG tanker); 
 the segmentation and boundaries of the market (is a harbour tug, for 
example, part of the same market as a VLCC?); 
 the nature of cycles and volatility in commercial shipbuilding, which 
causes so much difficulty for those participating in the market, and 
consideration as to whether anything could be considered to damp the 
damaging exaggerated nature of the cycle’s peaks (i.e. to reduce over-
ordering); 
 the problems of forecasting newbuilding demand that lead to unreliable 
results, with proposals for modifying the forecasting methodology. 
  
                                            
3 The research was funded internally by the Newcastle University.  Full results can be found in: Stott, 
P. (2017) ‘Competition and subsidy in commercial shipbuilding’. PhD thesis. Newcastle University. 
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2. The type of market 
2.1. Whilst there is only a small body of research to support the contention, it is 
generally assumed that a commercial shipbuilding market exists.  This 
assumption implies that a key factor relating to the economic concept of ‘a 
market’ applies to shipbuilding, which is to say that prices of products within 
that market (i.e. ships) are linked to common factors of supply and demand.  
In other words, the prices of different ship types would be expected to rise and 
fall together.  Such price links have been demonstrated to exist in past 
research .   
2.2. Shipbuilder Maxwell Ballard, almost a century ago, expressed surprise when 
his analysis showed that prices of different ship types moved together in 
parallel over time (Ballard, 1921).  Ballard had expected that price 
determination would have been specific to particular products and the link 
between prices of different products had not been expected.  This research 
was repeated for a wider range of products by Wijnolst and Wergeland in the 
1990s, with the same conclusion (Wijnolst and Wergeland, 1996).  Prices for 
different products move in parallel, suggesting that they are indeed part of the 
same market. 
2.3. It is generally assumed that the market is essentially constituted by products, 
being the different ship types demanded by the shipping industry.  The results 
of the research conducted at Newcastle University, however, suggests that 
commercial shipbuilding is based on the trading of a factor of production, 
shipbuilding capacity, and that price is derived from the underlying value of 
that capacity.  This explains the cross-price behaviour between products that 
compete for the same units of capacity.  To understand this, it is necessary to 
consider what actually changes hands at the point of contract signature, when 
the price of a new ship is fixed. 
2.4. With some rare exceptions, at the time of conclusion of a shipbuilding contract 
the vessel being contracted does not exist.  What is actually being traded is a 
promise to provide future capacity to build such a vessel at a specified future 
time: commonly referred to as a ‘slot’.  What is esentially being traded at the 
point that the price is fixed, therefore, is not a ship but shipyard capacity. 
2.5. A unit of capacity in the modern commercial shipbuilding industry is normally 
flexible to enable a shipyard to react to changes in demand for different 
products over time4.  Without such flexibility, a shipyard will be vulnerable to 
market shifts.  The products within the limits of flexibility of a unit of capacity 
for a particular shipyard are normally referred to as the shipyard’s ‘product 
mix’.  Products that form part of a shipyard’s product mix will be compatible 
                                            
4 Exceptions to this have included the construction of Liberty Ships and T2 tankers in US ‘emergency 
shipyards’ in WWII, ‘tanker factories’ such as Mitsubishi Kawasaki in Japan in the 1970s and, 
currently, European cruise-ship builders.  Such exceptions, however, have normally turned out to be a 
response to specific market conditions and have tended to be transient. 
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with that yards investment in fixed and human capital, supply chain, 
experience, track record and other factors of competitiveness such as 
customer relationships.  The products that form that mix are substitutable for 
the builder in economic terms in the utilisation of capacity.  This is at the core 
of the concept of ‘like product’ in competition law as it relates to commercial 
shipbuilding. 
2.6. To confirm the significance of the trade in capacity and its relationship with the 
product mix, consider the situation where a contract is cancelled.  If a contract 
were to be cancelled before construction commences, the shipyard would 
make every effort to re-sell the slot concerned, but the new contract would not 
necessarily be for the same ship type as that cancelled.  The capacity would 
be directed to whatever product presented the best economic opportunity for 
the yard at the time of the re-sale, and which is compatible with the shipyard’s 
product mix. 
2.7. The lag between contract signing and start of construction5, which is the 
essential feature of the forward nature of the trade in capacity,  is a variable, 
dependent on the state of the market.  An estimate of the development of 
backlog in the market as a whole is presented in Figure 1, calculated by 
dividing current orderbook (measured in CGT) by actual output over the 
preceeding year6.  
 
Figure 1 – Estimate of backlog in commercial shipbuilding in years, 1997 to 
2018 
2.8. Backlog has economic significance for both buyer and builder.  For the buyer, 
it represents scarcity of capacity and quantifies the level of business risk in 
                                            
5 Referred to hereafter as ‘backlog’. 
6 Output for the preceding 12 months is used in this relationship as a proxy to represent ‘active’ 
capacity.  
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placing the order whilst facing uncertainty relating to shipping market 
conditions (and thereby earning potential) on delivery.  For the builder, 
backlog represents scarcity of work and the business risk relates to the period 
up to the point at which the shipyard will run out of work.  For example, for a 
shipyard that typically takes nine months to construct a vessel, the backlog 
would become critical below nine months, at which point the yard is working 
on its last orders.     
2.9. The use of backlog in economic analysis of shipbuilding addresses problems 
that arise from the impossiblity of obtaining an accurate absolute value for 
capacity at any point in time. This is a difficulty that some researchers have 
referred to as the “shipyard capacity measurement problem… Shipbuilding 
capacity is difficult to measure and different sources quote different figures ” 
(Haralambides et al., 2005, p. 82). Backlog provides a proxy that works 
around this problem. 
2.10. Backlog drives a number of the features of the market (both in shipbuilding 
and shipping) that lead to difficulties.  One of the most significant is that there 
are ‘no brakes’ on output following the realisation that overcapacity is 
developing in the fleet and that shipping market conditions are deteriorating, 
as happened in 2008, for example.  The effect is to exaggerate cycles in both 
shipping and shipbuilding, leading to irrationally high peaks followed by 
extended trough periods.  This is discussed further below. 
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3. Price determination and cross-price behaviour 
3.1. For the commercial shipbuilding market to exist, products within that market 
must be subject to the same forces that determine price.  Much of the effort of 
Newcastle University’s research has been aimed at demonstrating that this is 
indeed the case, through analysis of cross-price behaviour between different 
ship types. 
3.2. A summary of prior research on newbuilding prices can be found in the PhD 
thesis on which this paper is based (Stott, 2017a)7.  Researchers generally 
agree that newbuilding prices are determined by a combination of the rational 
value to the purchaser and shipbuilding costs, with the relative importance of 
these two values varying depending on the state of the newbuilding cycle. 
3.3. In addition to these fundamental drivers, prices are affected by three other 
factors, listed in Table 1. 
Price determinant Description 
Freight rates Determine the rational value for the buyer or, in other words, 
determine what the buyer can afford to pay. 
Shipbuilding costs Determine the minimum price that a shipyard can charge without 
making a loss or requiring a subsidy. 
Demand for 
substitute 
products 
This relates to the discussion earlier, where it was established that 
price is determined by the underlying value of capacity, which is 
inherently flexible between products in the product mix.   
Backlog The significance of backlog to buyer and builder was discussed 
above.  Backlog is found to be the most significant predictor of 
price in statistical analysis.   
Subsidy Subsidy has been found to be persistent in the industry throughout 
its history and has a clear modifying effect on price7. 
Table 1: Determinants of newbuild price 
3.4. The determinants of price have been identified and, using correlation and 
linear regression analysis, it has been possible to confirm that cross-price 
elasticity exists in commercial shipbuilding, that is to say that price and 
demand are linked for different ship types within the market.  The price 
leaders in the recent peak market were LNG tankers and large container 
ships.  This will come as no surprise to those who have been working in the 
industry over this period.   
3.5. The implications of this are that price behaviour for one ship type can be 
shown to effect prices of different ship types that are like products.  For 
                                            
7 Please contact the author for a summary of prior research on price and subsidy if required. 
 7 
 
Paul.stott@newcastle.ac.uk 
Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK. 
example, suppressed prices of LNG tankers may effect the price of container 
ships, tankers or dry bulk carriers. 
3.6. It has only been possible to examine this for cargo-carrying vessels over 
5,000 GT, however.  Price behaviour in the small ship and passenger market 
segments and links between segments have not been analysed and are 
recommended for further research.  For example, it is not known to what 
extent price behaviour of LNG tankers may affect prices for OSV, in the 
smaller market segment, or prices for Cruise Ships.  See further discussion in 
the following section, on market segmentation. 
3.7. Whilst specific modelling of price has been successful, a generalised model of 
newbuilding price has not yet been achieved and this is recommended for 
further research.  The price determinants are known but econometric 
difficulties remain.  Similarly, a revised supply and demand function has been 
established in sketch form, but requires formal analysis to establish it 
definitively. 
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4. Market Segmentation 
4.1. Having established that the market exists, a question arises as to whether all 
ship types are part of a single market (as concluded for example by Wijnolst 
and Wergerland (Wijnolst and Wergeland, 1996, p. 183)).  Is it conceivable, 
for example, that a harbour tug can be said to be part of the same market as a 
VLCC?  Similarly, can it be said that a passenger ship is part of the same 
market as a Capesize dry bulk carrier? 
4.2. To examine the limits of the market in terms of product characteristics, two 
approaches have been used.  The first examined the market by size of 
products and the second in terms of investment and the competitive links 
between the characteristics of different products and that investment. 
4.3. When examined by ship size, the market itself offers no absolute boundaries 
between segments.   A pragmatic approach was therefore taken, examining 
product types, hull material, volume of demand, the nature of competition and 
demand volatility. On this basis, four segments of the commercial shipbuilding 
market are proposed, as summarised in Table 28. 
4.4. The market for large cargo-ships, over 5,000 GT, accounted for about 85% of 
all shipbuilding work in the period evaluated (measured by CGT).  Virtually all 
of this largest segment was fabricated in steel and involved construction of 
large cargo vessels.  This segment is proposed to constitute the ‘International 
Commercial Shipbuilding Market’, which was the subject of the EU’s 
prosecution in WTO in 2003. 
4.5. The separation of large passenger ships from the large cargo-ship segment is 
based on analysis of the matching of products to investment in physical and 
human capital and supply chain characteristics.  The balance of both skills 
and work content (steel to outfit) in particular is dissimilar in the passenger 
segment when compared to cargo-ship construction, leading to inefficient 
coverage of investment and reduced performance in large shipyards designed 
for high volume series building of large cargo vessels.  Typical series length, 
work volume, contract durations, material characteristics (in particular the use 
of thin plate), work flow and contractual conditions are also different.  In 
essence, construction of passenger vessels does not efficiently key in to the 
same factors that determine competitiveness in the large cargo-ship segment, 
and vice versa. 
4.6. Having said this, time series’ of prices for passenger ships have not been 
available to investigate dissimilarity of price behaviour when compared to 
                                            
8 A fifth segment is shown in the table, classed as ‘boat building’, which is outside the scope of this 
work. 
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cargo-carrying vessels, which would confirm absolutely whether or not such 
ships are part of the same market9.   
4.7. Other significant differences between the proposed market segments include 
changes in the buyers’ attitude to transactional risk and the relative cost of 
contract management in relation to total contract cost, with the likelihood of 
ordering at home increasing as ship size reduces.  Above all, however, the 
greatest difference between segments relates to the level of market volatility.  
Analysis of output reveals that only the International Commercial Shipbuilding 
Market is subject to the extreme cyclicality described later in this paper.  The 
two smaller market segments do experience volatility, but not to the same 
extent as the large ship segment over 5,000 GT.  The passenger segment 
shows relatively high volatility, but has been primarily in a growth phase over 
the period examined, and cyclical peaks have not yet appeared.  This 
conclusion may change when the fleet moves from the development phase to 
the mature phase of its life cycle.       
4.8. The remainder of this paper addresses the International Commercial 
Shipbuilding market exclusively, which is identified as a coherent market, 
including verification of cross-price behaviour between products in that 
segment.     
                                            
9 Such data could be provided in the form of indices, rather than absolute values, to preserve 
confidentiality of prices for the builders. 
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Sector Name Vessel 
Size 
Hull materials Proportion of 
market by work 
content (CGT) 
and by number of 
vessels [in 
parentheses], 2008 
to 2012 
Main Products Proportion of 
domestic and 
regional 
ordering10 
Demand 
volatility: 
coefficient of 
variation for the 
period 1963 to 
201211 
Boat building <100 GT Not assessed 
Workboat 
market 
100 to 500 
GT 
Composites, 
Aluminium 
and Steel 
3% [26%] 
Tugs, fishing vessels and 
other workboats: inland 
waterway and small cargo 
carrying ships. 
(87% workboats) 
57% domestic 
16% regional 
73% total  
20% 
Small ship 
market 
500 to 
5,000 GT 
Aluminium 
and Steel 
9% [23%] 
OSV, small cargo carrying 
ships and larger 
workboats. 
(52% workboats) 
43% domestic 
11% regional 
54% total  
26% 
Passenger 
ship market12 
>5,000 GT Steel 3% [1%] Cruise and ferry 
40% domestic 
21% regional 
61% total  
70% 
International 
commercial 
shipbuilding 
market 
>5,000 GT Steel 85% [50%] 
Large cargo ships. 
(~ 100% cargo carrying) 
26% domestic 
13% regional 
39% total  
87% 
Table 2 – Primary characteristics of the four proposed commercial market segments 
                                            
10 Based on the domicile countries of buyer and builder.  Domestic implies built in the country of domicile of the buyer.  Regional implies built outside the 
country of domicile of the buyer but within the same geographic region.  Regions include: Africa, Central America, Central Asia, East Europe, Far East, Middle 
East, Mediterranean Europe, North America, North Europe, Oceania, South America and South East Asia. 
11 Based on annual output, using the coefficient of variation to measure volatility. 
12 Given the downturn in cargo-ship construction since 2011 and the increase in the market for new cruise ships, the relative importance of the passenger 
sector will have increased significantly compared to the period shown in this table. 
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5. Cycles and volatility 
5.1. In the period post-WWII the international commercial shipbuilding industry has 
been through two major cycles, as illustrated in Figure 2.  This figure presents 
both absolute values for output, measured in GT delivered, and the relative 
magnitude of this output to the total extant fleet at the time of that delivery13.   
 
Figure 2 - Commercial shipbuilding output 1960 to 2015 (solid line and left 
hand scale) and ratio of output to existing fleet size (dotted line and right hand 
scale) 
5.2. Evaluation of a longer time series, back to the 19th Century, presented in 
Figure 3, reveals that these two most recent peaks follow two previous peaks 
in the pre-WWII period, with an average interval between peaks over the past 
125 years of 30.6 years. 
  
                                            
13 The reason for showing both is that successive peaks in the market have, so far, been 
exponentially larger than preceding peaks, and tend to mask the size of previous peaks when looking 
at time series. 
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Figure 3 - Commercial shipbuilding output (in gross tons), 1892 to 201414 
5.3. It is established elsewhere that the modern commercial shipbuilding industry, 
in terms of products, processes and shipbuilding strategy, emerged following 
WWII (Stott, 2017b).  It is difficult to associate these four peaks as being 
linked, therefore, but the pattern that has emerged from the long term analysis 
is compelling nonetheless.  A consistent significant feature of the peaks is 
their exaggerated extent, with over-ordering of tonnage followed by protracted 
trough periods whilst excess shipping capacity generated at the peak is 
absorbed into the fleet. 
5.4. The two post-war peak values have been equivalent to about 11% of fleet 
capacity whilst the two pre-war values were higher than this at 14% for the 
1919 peak and 19% for the 1944 peak.  It is postulated that both these peaks 
included an uplift due to replacement of war losses, in addition to any 
underlying cyclical demand. 
5.5. More research is needed to understand the nature of the cycle and its 
generators.  Caution is advised particularly because the nature of volatility of 
output changed significantly following WWII and as the modern industry was 
established.  This can clearly be seen in Figure 4, which presents year-on-
year change in output between 1893 and 2014. 
                                            
14 Data provided by Clarkson Research for the most recent period.  Historical data taken from Lloyd’s 
Register returns, available in the Marine Technology Special Collection of historical data relating to 
the shipyard industries, at Newcastle University.  Complete returns are not available for the WWII 
period, where data from Japan and Axis Powers is missing.  An estimate of output at that time has 
been made based on available returns from other countries.  
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Figure 4 – Year on year change in commercial shipbuilding output, 1893 to 
201415 
5.6. It can be seen by visual inspection of Figure 4 that the nature of the volatility 
of output changed with the establishment of the modern industry following 
WWII.  Volatility halved, as measured by the coefficient of variation.  The 
effect has been that the market has seen much longer periods of sustained 
growth in the modern era, with associated investment in expansion of 
capacity.   This change in the characteristic of the cycles has accentuated 
some of the negative features of the cycle. 
5.7. The cycle causes difficulties for both shipbuilders and ship owners.   In a 
keynote address to London Shipping Week in September 2017, the Chief 
Executive of ship operator Euronav posed the question: “How do you stop 
shipowners overbuilding their market?” (Pierce, 2017).   TradeWinds, the 
industry newspaper in which this was reported, referred to this as “potentially 
the toughest shipping question of all”.  These comments reflect a proposition 
that has emerged from Newcastle University’s research that the cycles are 
exaggerated in two respects.  Firstly, that peak production levels are higher 
than they should rationally be for sustainability of the related industries, with 
the result that the industry builds more shipping capacity than the fleet can 
absorb and more shipbuilding capacity than can be sustained over the long 
term.  Secondly, that this then leads to extended trough periods, which are 
longer than they perhaps need to be.  Excess fleet capacity generated at the 
peak periodically suppresses ordering: “Improvements in freights lead to a 
tendency to over-order and depressions to a tendency to postpone even 
replacements” (Parkinson, 1960, p. 79). 
                                            
15 The figure for 1944 (204%) is omitted for the sake of clarity of the graph.  It is also excluded from 
calculations because it appears as an outlier and is an estimate, rather than a confirmed actual value. 
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5.8. The steep decline and extended trough phases of the cycle cause problems 
for shipbuilders because capacity utilisation deteriorates and prices fall.  This 
is a significant cause of company failure and in some cases leads to a need 
for Government assistance to maintain capacity in anticipation of a market 
upturn.  Subsidies and shipyard closures were a strong feature of the industry 
during that phase of the cycle in the 1980s and that situation is repeating at 
the same stage of the cycle at the time of writing this paper.   
5.9. Table 3 presents a summary of the drivers of the cycle and the causes of the 
exaggeration of the peaks, including comments on future prospects for 
demand. 
5.10. Whilst it is unlikely, and undesirable, that anything could be done to eliminate 
the cycle of shipbuilding demand, a valid question that should be addressed is 
whether anything could be done to try to reduce the damaging exaggeration 
of the cycle, at the root of which is the tendency to over-order at the peak, 
coupled to the effects of backlog.  This is strongly recommended for further 
research, in particular relating to a ‘leading indicator’ that would warn 
investors when backlogs are becoming too long and ordering is far exceeding 
the rate at which the shipping industry can absorb the investment in new 
ships.
 15 
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Cycle factor Comments 
Underlying drivers of 
demand 
Expansion of seaborne 
trade 
Demand generated by the need to carry expanding sea-borne trade.  At 
present it is not anticipated that seaborne trade will cease growing, although 
there are, of course, many political, trade and global development scenarios 
where this could be an outcome. 
Reinvestment cycles 
Demand generated by the need to replace obsolete ships.  There is no 
reason to expect that reinvestment cycles will not continue in shipping. 
Emergence of new fleet 
sectors 
The development of new and more efficient ‘very large’ and ‘ultra large’ 
crude oil carriers (VLCCs and ULCCs) was a significant feature of demand 
contributing to the 1975 peak and the development of ‘ultra large’ container 
ships and the expansion of the LNG fleet were significant in the 2011 peak. 
Fleet development responding to changes in trades and technical 
developments is likely to continue.   
Cycle drivers 
Cycles in the shipping 
industry 
Cyclicality is one of the fundamentals underlying the shipping market 
(Thanopoulu, 2002, p. 623).  There is a strong synergic relationship between 
the shipping and shipbuilding cycles.  The trough phase of the shipbuilding 
cycle, where replacement demand may be suppressed, leads to an 
improvement in the supply and demand balance in the fleet, which, coupled 
to the lag between order and delivery, contributes to the periodic 
achievement of irrationally high freight rates (Stopford, 2009, p. 160 to 169).  
Periodic high freight rates in turn stimulate peaks of investment in new 
tonnage. The generation of overcapacity leading to suppression of demand, 
followed by un-checked over-ordering when the markets recover, from the 
current perspective, appears likely to be a self-perpetuating feature of the 
cycle. 
 
Table 3: Generators of the commercial shipbuilding cycle and its exaggerators (continued over page) 
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Cycle exaggerators 
Backlog 
The lag between ordering a ship and its delivery is inevitable due to the 
nature of the industry.  The lag means that ships continue to be delivered (for 
up to six years in the 2011 peak) even though demand for new ships has 
evaporated.  This leads to periodic overcapacity that exaggerates the peak 
and lengthens the trough.  
Sentiment and lack of 
memory in the system  
Following the peaks, investment in new ships is seen as high risk by both 
ship owners and financiers, due to extended periods of low freight rates and 
poor returns.  In this situation shipowners dramatically reduce investment 
and “postpone even replacement” (Parkinson, 1960, p. 79), or in other words 
reinvestment demand is suppressed.  Once equilibrium returns to the 
shipping market ship operation becomes highly profitable, in part due to the 
lag between order and delivery and the nature of supply and demand 
functions in shipping, and shipping once again becomes a target for 
investors.   
Very poor investment conditions in the market following the peak in 1975 led 
to an exodus of banks from shipping finance, such that “in 1986 no more 
than a handful , say 12 to 15 banks, were actively looking for new business” 
(Stopford, 2017).  With this exodus went experience and knowledge.  This is 
coupled to a pitch between peaks of over 30 years, which means that a lot of 
expertise in general will have retired from the market by the time recovery 
starts.  Inexperienced investors may be overly swayed by prevailing market 
conditions without sufficient knowledge of the cyclical behaviour of the 
market, contributing to over-ordering. 
 
Table 3 (continued): Generators of the commercial shipbuilding cycle and its exaggerators  
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6. Forecasting of newbuilding demand 
6.1. The established method for forecasting newbuilding demand is based on a 
combination of demand for reinvestment coupled to demand for fleet 
development and expansion.  This methodology does not have a strong track 
record for accuracy.  It is proposed here that two flaws in the method could be 
addressed to improve the accuracy of forecasting and this is recommended 
for further study. 
6.2. The first flaw is that the existing model forecasts the wrong thing.  It forecasts 
the rational demand for new ships to satisfy the need of seaborne trade.  
Investment in new ships, however, is not based on a rational evaluation of 
transport needs, but on a demand (at times an imperative) to invest in new 
ships.  This is not the same thing.  Methodologies to try to predict the demand 
for investment in new tonnage need to be developed. 
6.3. The second flaw is in the assumptions for reinvestment.  These tend to be 
based on the economic life of the vessel, with scrapping typically taking place 
at between 20 and 25 years.  The need to replace capacity that is scrapped 
out of the fleet will clearly have an effect on demand for new ships, but this 
effect is indirect.  Demand is created by the effect of scrapping on the balance 
of supply and demand in the fleet and this is not a manifestation of the 
reinvestment cycle. 
6.4. Research at Newcastle University shows that the typical buyer of a new 
vessel will reinvest when the vessel reaches around ten years old, at which 
point the ship is traded on through the second hand markets (Stott, 2014)16.  
This suggests that a reinvestment peak should be expected at ten years, not 
at 20 to 25 years.  (Mihaylova, 2018) 
6.5. Early research on reinvestment looked for an ‘echo’ or ‘wave’ phenomenon in 
newbuilding demand, but failed to find any significant manifestation of this 
(Tinbergen, 1931; Einarsen, 1938).   Einarsen distinguished between 
‘reinvestment’ and ‘replacement’, which is essentially the change that is 
suggested here.    
6.6. Figure 5 shows demand from the 1975 peak in newbuilding output projected 
forwards for 20 and 25 years against the progression of output in the recent 
peak.  It can be clearly seen that there is no simple ‘echo’ or ‘wave’ 
phenomenon here and that the normal forecasting technique would incorrectly 
predict reinvestment demand on this basis.  What can also be seen, however, 
is a minor peak at around ten years from the original 1975 peak, which it is 
                                            
16 The 2014 research found that 1 in 5 vessels, taking into account the three main ship types (wet and 
dry bulk and container) remained with the original owner for the ship’s full life.  Replacement is 
therefore applicable to 80% of the original demand.  Ownership behaviour of other ship types has not 
yet been researched.  Updated research supervised by the author at Newcastle University, funded by 
the Prime Foundation, has confirmed that this pattern has not changed in the modern fleet 
(Mihaylova, 2018).  
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proposed could be the actual manifestation of reinvestment in shipbuilding 
demand. 
 
Figure 5 – Reinvestment cycle analysis 
6.7. The suggested actual reinvestment demand propogated by the 1975 peak 
can be seen more clearly when set against that peak, as illustrated in Figure 
6. 
 
Figure 6 – The suggested manifestation of reinvestment demand at around ten 
years following the 1975 cyclical peak 
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7. Summary of recommendations for further research 
7.1. The following subjects are recommended for further research: 
 Analysis of cross-price links between market segments to confirm the 
extent of the influence of pricing in the International commercial 
shipbuilding market on smaller ships. 
 Analysis of pricing of passenger ships, to confirm whether or not they are 
part of the same market as cargo-carrying vessels in economic terms. 
 Evaluation of the potential for the establishment of a leading indicator to 
damp damaging exaggerations of newbuilding cycle peaks. 
 Establishment of a generalised model for newbuilding prices and an 
improved model for supply and demand functions. 
 Development of an improved forecasting model for newbuilding demand 
to achieve more reliable results. 
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